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INTRODUCTION 
Comes now Defendants/Appellants pursuant to Rule 24(c) and 
offer the following reply and clarification to certain issues 
raised by Plaintiff/Appellee's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ENTIRE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE CASE 
AND DENYING THE DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff's counsel, as a strong advocate for her client, 
focuses solely upon the number of days between Plaintiff's first 
request of discovery to the date of the default judgment. 
However, in emphasizing only the time frame, Plaintiff's counsel 
fails to recognize significant events that took place during the 
intern time frame. 
To begin with, Defendants in good faith answered thirty-five 
(35) of the thirty-nine (39) interrogatories, sixty-nine (69) 
days before the trial court entered default judgment. See the 
Defendants1 brief page 4 and 5. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff ignores the discovery obtained in 
the Bennett v. Craqhead almost three hundred (300) days before 
Plaintiff sought discovery in the present case. See Defendants' 
Appendix B. The discovery Plaintiff sought in the present case 
was very duplicative of the discovery they had already obtained 
in the Bennett case. Therefore, any lack of discovery in the 
present case has caused little, if any, prejudice upon the 
Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff also fails to admit that it took themselves one 
hundred six days (106) days to clarify their requests for 
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documents and the four (4) objectionable interrogatories. Such 
clarification did not occur until July 8, 1994, during deposition 
of Mr. Padan. (Defendants Appendix C-8 pages 3-6). 
Plaintiff's efforts to characterize Defendants as 
individuals willfully refusing to comply with discovery requests 
is simply unfounded in the facts as set forth in the record. On 
June 17, 1994, the Defendants filed what they considered good 
faith and complete answers to the interrogatories and asked for 
clarifications on the types of documents sought by the Plaintiff. 
See Appendix C of the Appellants' brief. It was not until July 8 
of Mr. Padan's deposition that the Plaintiff clarified documents 
they sought and narrowed the remaining four (4) of the thirty-
nine (39) interrogatories. At that time both parties agreed that 
the documents should be provided by July 15, 1994. See 
Appellants' brief page 7. Five (5) days later the Defendant 
Padan's office was burglarized. 
As an example of Plaintiff's counsel's continual failure to 
recognize all the facts of the case, Defendants refer this Court 
to the Affidavit of Ms. Jennifer Falk dated 19th of August, 1994. 
This Affidavit was in support of the Plaintiff's Motion for Entry 
of Judgment. In the Affidavit Plaintiff's counsel simply states: 
I have received no documents from Defendants since 
the entry of the court's ruling of July 27, 1994. 
I have not received any discovery whatsoever, 
including answers to interrogatories from Defendants 
since the date of the court's ruling. 
More than twenty days have passed since the date 
of the court's ruling of July 27, 1995. 
Nowhere in the affidavit does Plaintiff's counsel mention 
the July 8 Padan deposition, the July 13 burglary, or the 
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numerous messages left her by Defendant Padan and Defendant's 
counsel. This Affidavit demonstrates how the Plaintiff focuses 
on certain facts but ignores significant other facts. 
Neither in the above described Affidavit nor in Plaintiff's 
Brief does Plaintiff address the fact that both the Defendant 
Padan and Defendants' counsel left several messages with 
Plaintiff's counsel disclosing the burglary and asking for a 
return phone call to work out contingencies. Plaintiff's counsel 
fails to mention that she did not return any such phone calls or 
seek an explanation from the Defendants as to why discovery had 
not been made. In fact, it was not until August 4, 1994, the 
date the court entered an order and judgment against the 
Defendants, that the Plaintiff's counsel first responded to the 
numerous messages left by the Defendant and Defendants' counsel. 
The letter dated August 8, 1994, which is included in Defendants' 
Appendix E illustrates the extent to which Plaintiff's counsel 
went in an effort to stay ignorant of the facts to utilize the 
lack of knowledge of the burglary of the Defendant Padan's office 
to her client's benefit. 
The letter reads in part as follows: 
I have attempted to contact you during the last three 
weeks leaving various phone message with your personal 
secretary, most recently on August 4, as well as with 
the receptionist of Winder and Haslam. The purpose of 
my attempts to contact you, as well as Mr. Padan's 
separate attempts, was to inform you that Mr. Padan's 
business was burglarized on July 13, 1994. Rather than 
giving me the courtesy of returning my phone calls, you 
have proceeded to pursue your motion for sanctions. 
Rather than talk to me directly you have responded by 
letter which was faxed to my office on August 4, 1994. 
Perhaps you feel justified in maintaining an 
intentional ignorance of the events, however I believe 
your actions are not justifiable. 
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Plaintiff's counsel should not be allowed to intentionally 
stay ignorant of the circumstances concerning discovery to this 
court. Defendants merely ask this court to review the 
Plaintiff's recitation of the total course of proceedings and 
determine if based upon the total circumstances, the Defendants 
have willfully abused the discovery process warranting the entry 
of the Default Judgment as sanctions. 
II. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING DOCUMENTS AFTER THE BURGLARY 
Plaintiff's Brief raises two issues concerning the 
Defendants' ability to provide certain information after the 
Burglary. The Defendants now seek to clarify. 
The first question concerns the ability of Mr. Craghead to 
produce documents after the burglary. Mr. Padan, being the 
general contractor and operator of Aspen Construction, retained 
all business records at his office mostly on computer. Mr. 
Craghead did not retain any duplicative or additional business 
copies at a separate location. Given this fact it would be 
impossible for Mr. Craghead to produce any documents after the 
burglary for all of his documents and information were held at 
Mr. Padan's place of business which was burglarized. 
As for the impossibility of producing certain printed 
documents after the burglary, Plaintiff should understand that 
the documents sought in his request for production of documents 
are merely printed copies of information electronically stored on 
the Defendants' computer. The computer data having been stolen, 
it became impossible for Defendants to produce hard copies of 
such information. 
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The burglary also prevented the Defendant's from producing 
the "architectural plans, Defendant Padan's 1992 and 1993 day 
planners, bills and bids and invoices submitted by the 
contractor." The individuals who burglarized Padan's office were 
not tidy. The entire office was "turned upside down." Not only 
was all the electronic information which Mr. Padan had complied 
for the Plaintiffs stolen, but everything that was left was 
scattered throughout the office. Mr. Padan was in no position to 
provide the documents mentioned above after the burglary since 
such papers were scattered along with all other papers and 
equipment throughout the office. Mr. Padan had to maintain an 
ongoing business despite the robbery, making it impossible for 
him to take a number of consecutive days away from work and 
repair the office. In short, all documents and information were 
contained on the computers except for a few papers that were 
scattered throughout the office amongst the rest of Mr. Padan's 
papers. The information having been stolen or lost, made it 
impossible for the Defendants to make hard copies of such 
documents and transfer them to the Plaintiff after the burglary. 
With these facts in mind as well as additional facts set 
forth in more detail in Defendants' brief, Defendants submit that 
the trial court breached the boundaries of discretion as set 
forth in Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976) and at page 
12 of Defendants' Brief. Having abused the standards of 
discretion, the Defendant asks this court to Vacate the trial 
courts Judgment and remand the case for trial, thereby enforcing 
the policy articulated in Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 
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(Utah 1976) which "resolves doubts in favor of permitting parties 
to have their day in court on the merits of the controversy." Id. 
III. AS A MATTER OF LAW THE TRIAL COURTfS ENTRY OF A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE 
OVERTURNED FOR FAILURE TO COMPORT WITH RULE 4-
504(2) OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
The Plaintiff misstates the Defendants second issue, by 
assuming that the Plaintiff is alleging a violation of Rule 4-
504(1). Rather, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff 
violated Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
which requires that: 
Copies of all proposed findings, judgments, and order 
shall be served upon the opposing party before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days 
after service. 
Based upon the certificate of mailing attached to the 
proposed order, the proposed order was mailed to the Defendants 
only two (2) days prior to the court signing the Order. The 
Defendants were not given five (5) days to respond to the 
proposed order as required by Rule 4-504(2)—an order which for 
the first time mentioned the twenty (20) day time limit. Given 
the time required for delivering mail from Salt Lake to Logan, 
the Defendants had no notice of the twenty (20) day time limit 
before the court signed the Order. 
Plaintiff alleges that the Circuit Court's Minute Entry put 
the Defendants on notice. However, such is not the case. The 
Minute Entry was entered without a hearing. Nor was the Minute 
Entry sent to the Defendants. 
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To allow a party to mail a proposed order to the opposing 
party only two (2) days before the court rules on the order 
denies the opposing party "timely and adequate notice and 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way [which is] the very 
heart of procedural fairness." Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 
753 (Utah 1990). 
IV. AS A MATTER OF LAW TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS BE OVERTURNED FOR FAILURE TO 
COMPORT WITH RULE 4-504(4) OF THE UTAH CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
The Plaintiff's brief fails to address the issues raised by 
Defendants' brief concerning Rule 4-504(4). The evidence in the 
record unequivocally demonstrates that a signed judgment was not 
transferred to the Defendants as required by Rule 4-504(4). See 
Defendants' Brief page 22. Such a breach constitutes error by 
trial court, requiring the judgment entered against the 
Defendants vacate and the case be remanded for trial. See 
Defendants' brief pp. 22-23. 
V. DEFENDANTS HAVE PRESERVED THE ISSUES OF CLAIM AND 
ISSUE PRECLUSION AND THEY ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT. 
The Defendants have preserved the issues of claim and issue 
preclusion through their Answer and Counterclaim. Defendants' 
Counterclaim addresses the offsets to the Plaintiff's claims. 
The $11,000 which Bennett was precluded from collecting is an 
offset to Plaintiffs 13,515.58 claim. See Appendix A of the 
Defendants' brief. 
Moreover, the fact that the trial court in the present case 
dismissed the Defendants' Answer and entered judgment for the 
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Plaintiff prior to trial (let alone any pre-trial conference) 
explains why the $11,000 offset was not more specifically laid 
out and presented at the trial court. The Defendants simply were 
not yet in a position to more explicitly set forth the offset 
resulting from the dismissal of Mr. Bennett's claim. 
However, the fact that Defendants' counsel questioned Mr. 
Mower at the deposition about the money attributable to Mr. 
Bennett's claim demonstrates that Defendants were pursuing such 
amounts as an offset. 
In fact, at the time the trial court entered the default 
judgment, Defendants' counsel was in the process of drafting a 
summary judgment motion precluding Plaintiff from collecting the 
money owed to Bennett. 
The Defendants did raise and preserve the issue of offsets 
in the trial court, given the infancy of the proceedings at the 
time the case was dismissed, Defendants assert that they have 
sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal. 
VI. THE ISSUE WAS LITIGATED ON THE MERITS. 
Plaintiff in his brief cites Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc. 786 P.2d 1350, in support of the necessity of preserving 
issues for appeal. However, Plaintiff fails to cite the language 
on page 1358 of the Rinqwood opinion footnote 5 which states: 
The fact that the prior action was dismissed with 
prejudice does not nullify res judicata application, as 
such constitutes litigation on the merits. Rinqwood at 
1358 citing Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a); 
Steiner v. State, 495 P.2d 809 (Utah 1972). 
The language in the Bennett v. Craqhead order of dismissal 
states: 
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For good cause appearing it is hereby: ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this action is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth in 
this order and the Minute Entry dated March 31, 1994. 
(Appendix A of Defendants' Brief.) 
The basis for this dismissal with prejudice was Section 58-
55-17 U.C.A., which prevents unlicensed contractors from suing 
for services rendered. 
To allow Mr. Mower to collect the "just over $11,000" for 
Mr. Bennett, when the District Court has ruled Mr. Bennett is not 
entitled to collect such money violates the essence of res 
judicata. To allow Mr. Mower to collect and retain just over 
$11,000 of his $13,515 claim to which he is not entitled 
constitutes unjust enrichment and one of the basis for the 
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the totality of facts in record, the trial court did 
abuse its discretion in dismissing Defendant's answer and denying 
Defendants Motion to set aside the judgment. 
The trial court erred by failing to follow the procedures 
required in Sections 4-504(2) and 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Procedure. 
And the $11,000 offset to Plaintiff's 13.515.58 claim was 
properly preserved given the infancy of the trial courts 
proceedings. Since the District court entered a final judgment 
on the merits of Mr. BennetT's claim which constitutes "just over 
$11,000" of Mr. Padan's claim, by his own admission, Plaintiff 
should be precluded from collecting that $11,000 dollars. 
For the reasons set forth in Defendants' Brief and Reply, 
Defendants respectfully request this Court order the Circuit 
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Court to Vacate the Default Judgment and reinstate Defendants' 
Answer and Counterclaim and remand for trial on the merits, 
including the $11,000 offset. Alternatively, Defendants ask the 
court to remand for trial the issue of reducing Plaintiff's 
judgment by the amount attributable to Mr. Bennett's claim. 
^unsel^cGr^Appellants 
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